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Scholarship has dominantly ignored or negatively evaluated the work of the League of Nations 
(LoN) in the law of state responsibility, starting the story of the codification with the 
International Law Commission (ILC). As it is well-known, the ILC decided to begin the study 
of the topic of the responsibility of states in 1955, and in the subsequent almost half century, 
five different special rapporteurs prepared thirty-three reports on the topic, leading to the 
Articles on Responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts (ARSIWA) as a final 
outcome in 2001.1 Compared to the gigantic codification work of the ILC, the contribution of 
the LoN to the law of state responsibility might seem both short-lived and negligible: from 
1924 to 1930, it prepared and convened a four weeks-long conference in The Hague to 
elaborate the foundations of a convention on state responsibility for damage caused to the 
person or property of foreigners. The conference did not produce any draft treaty or report; 
commentators considered the State responsibility agenda as a ‘failure’2 or ‘the least 
successful’3 compared to the two simultaneous codification agendas in The Hague on 
nationality and territorial waters that led to a treaty with three protocols and two 
recommendations on principles, respectively.4 Relying on this negative narrative, most 
manuals of public international law start the history of the law of state responsibility with the 
ILC’s work, mentioning passim5 or ignoring6 the scene of The Hague codification attempt 
under the auspices of the LoN. This article proposes to rethink this dominant view and claims 
that the LoN’s codification process not only initiated, but substantially contributed to the 
codification of the law of state responsibility, leading to lasting methods, concepts, principles 
 
 
1 Analytical Guide to the Work of the International Law Commission, available at: 
https://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/9_6.shtml#fout (last accessed on 10 December 2019). 
2 Walter Simons, The Evolution of International Public Law in Europe since Grotius (1931) p. 84; Clémentine 
Bories, "The Hague Conference of 1930" in J. Crawford, A. Pellet and S. Olleson (eds.), The Law of 
International Responsibility (2010) pp. 64. 
3 Ramaa P. Dhokalia, The Codification of Public International Law (1970) p. 125. 
4 Ibid., p. 122-125.  
5 E.g. Antonio Cassese, International Law (2001) p. 183; Patrick Daillier and Alain Pellet, Droit international 
public (7th ed., 2002) p. 763. 
6 E.g. Peter Fischer and Heribert Franz Köck, Völkerrecht: Das Recht Der Universellen Staatengemeinschaft (6., 
durchgesehene und erw., 2004) p. 332–333; James Crawford and Simon Olleson, "The Character and Forms of 
International Responsibility" in M.D. Evans (ed.), International Law (2014) pp. 443–447; Robert Kolb, The 
International Law of State Responsibility: An Introduction (2018) p. 8–11; James Crawford, Brownlie’s 
Principles of Public International Law (9th ed., 2019) p. 523–524. 
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and norms that have been integrated in the contemporary canon of the rules of state 
responsibility. 
 The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 argues that through the organisation of the 
written and oral phases of The Hague codification conference, the LoN introduced lasting 
methods of codification that served as a model for the later work of the ILC. Section 3 discusses 
the general principles that The Hague conference set out while defining the responsibility of 
states, making it both a conceptualised and autonomous subject of international law. Those 
principles have formed the basis of the ARSIWA which recognise their LoN origin. The 
following two sections discuss particular norms debated in The Hague codification process and 
argue that those norms have contributed to the subsequent development of the contemporary 
rules of state responsibility.  Section 4 examines one of the constitutive elements of state 
responsibility, attribution, and claims that The Hague conference established sound rules of 
attribution considered even nowadays as valid norms. Section 5 focuses on circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness that the LoN’s codification process prepared to codify for the first 
time in the history of the discipline but could not discuss in sufficient details. The written and 
oral dialogue of states and experts on those general and particular concepts, principles or norms 
of state responsibility has established the foundations of a truly universal codification 
discussion that has continued until today. The conclusions will explain that the lasting impact 
of the LoN’s codification in the international law of state responsibility confirms the pioneering 
work of the LoN. 
2 A Codification Experience 
The LoN’s codification project on state responsibility was a learning experience, part of the 
first international law codification work within a purportedly universal international 
organisation. The LoN was the first intergovernmental organisation to announce its ambition 
to systematically codify international law and at the time it was considered as the legitimate 
subject to do so. While the Covenant did not grant it any competence in matter of the 
development or codification of international law, commentators argued that this followed form 
its general mandate to maintain international peace and security.7 The Covenant was itself 
 
7 Shabtai Rosenne, "Codification Revisited after 50 Years", 2 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 
(1998) pp. 1, 2; Jean Ray, Commentaire du Pacte de la Société des nations selon la politique et la jurisprudence 
des organes de la Société (1930) p. 85. 
4 
 
viewed as a proper codification8 or the “Higher Law”,9 that is a treaty enshrining far-reaching 
obligations of states in the matter of international peace and security. Furthermore, there was a 
widespread feeling that the LoN could undertake codification of international law in an 
effective, timely manner.10 
 The first codification products of the LoN and the International Labour Organisation 
were technical conventions, considered as a continuation of an activity which had been 
practiced since the 19th century through the formation of international unions in various 
domains (communications, literary artistic and industrial property, public health, and so 
forth).11 Based on five years’ experience of the LoN, Sweden proposed the Assembly in 1924 
to recommend the Council the codification of international law in certain matters.12 At the 
plenary meeting, the delegate of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes relied on various 
sources of the LoN to justify its competence to undertake the codification of international law: 
Article 24 of the Covenant which considered the LoN as the lead of international 
administration, on the one hand, and the creation of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) which supposed an obligation to define the substantive rules of international law, 
on the other. As he concluded, “[i]t is only natural that the LoN, being the most highly 
developed of existing international organisations, should assist in the establishment of rules of 
conduct to be observed by all States in their foreign relations”.13 
 On 22 September 1924, the Assembly recognised the LoN’s role in “meeting the 
legislative needs of international relations” and adopted a resolution on the “development of 
international law”.14 The Assembly specifically requested the Council to convene a Committee 
of Experts which shall have the duty: 
(1) To prepare a provisional list of the subjects of international law, the regulation of 
which by international agreement would seem to be most desirable and realisable at the 
present moment;  
 
8 P.J. Baker, "The Codification of International Law" (1924) 5 British Yearbook of International Law (1924) pp. 
38, 54; Dhokalia, supra note 3, p. 113. 
9 Hersch Lauterpacht, "The Covenant as the Higher Law" 17 British Yearbook of International Law (1936) pp. 
54. 
10 Baker (n 9) 58; Rosenne (n 8) 2–3. 
11 8 League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement (1927) no. 7, pp. 750 (report of the Committee of 
Experts). 
12 23 League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement (1924) pp. 82-83 (Records of the 5th Assembly, 
12th Pl. mtg.). 
13 23 League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement (1924) pp. 124.  
14 21 League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement (1924) pp. 10. 
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(2) After communication of the list by the Secretariat to the Governments of States, 
whether Members of the League or not, for their opinion, to examine the replies 
received; and  
(3) To report to the Council on the questions which are sufficiently ripe and on the 
procedure which might be followed with a view to preparing eventually for conferences 
for their solution.15 
 This has led to the creation of the Committee of Experts for the Progressive 
Codification of International Law.16 The Committee of Experts considered various subjects for 
codification, among which the responsibility of states for damage suffered within their 
territories by foreigners figured from the very beginning.17 In 1927, based on the replies of 
various governments, the Committee of Experts recommended the Council seven subjects as 
being, in certain of their aspects, sufficiently ripe for discussion in international conference. 
Among them, the Committee of Experts considered that five important subjects might be the 
subject of an international conference or conferences after the necessary additional preparatory 
work has been performed.18 These topics included the “[r]esponsibility of States for Damage 
done in their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners”. Based on the Council’s report 
to the Assembly, adopted on 13 June 1927, the First Committee agreed to limit the codification 
project to three subjects: nationality, territorial waters and responsibility of states for damage 
caused in their territory to the person or property of foreigners.19 Regarding the question 
whether the future codification should be a mere registration of the law in force or an attempt 
to adapt it to practical needs, the Committee held that “while, in order to lead to useful results, 
the Conference must refrain from making too many innovations, it cannot limit itself to the 
mere registration of the existing law”.20 Therefore, progressive development of the law of state 
responsibility was foreseen. 
 The law of state responsibility was elaborated as a subject of the law of nations by 
positivist pioneers such as Anzilotti and Triepel.21 Before The Hague codification conference, 
there were various international gatherings “sufficient to prove that unanimity can scarcely be 
 
15 Ibid. 
16 33 League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement (1925) pp. 175-176. 
17 See the original list of 21 subjects in 1924: ibid., pp. 176(f); 6 League of Nations Official Journal (1925), no. 
6, pp. 843(f). 
18 “First Meeting (Private, and Then Public)” 8 League of Nations Official Journal (1927) pp. 751. 
19 54 League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement (1927) pp. 484-488, Annex 35. 
20 Ibid., pp. 487. 
21 Heinrich Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (CL Hirschfeld 1899); Dionisio Anzilotti, Teoria Generale 
Della Responsabilità Dello Stato Nel Diritto Internazionale, vol I (F Lumachi, 1902). 
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said to exist in regard to the general trend or the technique of the work of codification”.22 In 
1929, the Paris Conference on the Treatment of Foreigners attempted to codify the norms on 
the protection of foreigners, without any outcome document.23 Furthermore, codification of the 
law of State responsibility started simultaneously in regional, especially inter-American inter-
state instruments and private initiatives, and academic codifications. However, it was an 
essential intention of states to charge this time the world organisation with the codification: 
after the Netherlands undertook to host the conference, various delegations insisted that the 
LoN should not renounce its role in favour of a member state.24 
 In The Hague, state delegates were aware of the importance of the “theory of 
responsibility in any juridical system” and of its norms as “they key rules of any juridical 
system”.25 International lawyers had abandoned the idea that the responsibility of the state is 
incompatible with sovereignty, as state responsibility for breaches of its obligations was widely 
recognised by state practice. For certain states in the interwar period, it seemed “obvious that 
the rules determining the extent and nature of the international responsibility of States in their 
mutual relations constitute one of the most important problems of international law”.26 
 Beyond the search for universal norms fulfilling an aspiration for justice, the delegates 
in The Hague wished to answer to practical needs and identify “the rules which best meet the 
juridical needs of our time” in the field of state responsibility for damage to foreigners.27 In his 
opening speech, the Chairman of the meetings expressed the desirability to codify rules on this 
matter “as definite as possible”.28 
 As a sign of the importance of the codification project, 47 states participated in the 
codification procedure, including nine countries that were not member states of the LoN and 
various non-European LoN member States (such as Latin-American States, India, Canada, 
Japan, Siam, South Africa, or Egypt as British protectorate).29 
 
22 Acts of the Conference for the Codification of International Law (The Hague, 1930), vol. IV: Meetings of the 
Committees. Minutes of the Third Committee (Responsibility of States), League of Nations Publications, V. 
Legal, document C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.V, 17 May 1930, pp. 18 (Mr d’Avila Lima, Portugal). 
23 John Ward Cutler, ‘The Treatment of Foreigners in Relation to the Draft Convention and Conference of 1929’ 
(1933) 27 American Journal of International Law 225. 
24 55 League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement (1927) pp. 19-21, Mr Lange (Norway), Mr Motta 
(Switzerland), Sir William Moore (Australia), Mr Rolin (Belgium). 
25 C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.V, supra note 22, pp. 15 (Mr Basdevant, Chairman). 
26 Ibid., pp. 19 (Mr Nagaoka, Japan). 
27 Ibid. (Mr Basdevant, Chairman). 
28 Ibid., pp. 15 (Mr Basdevant, Chairman). 
29 C.75.M.69.1929.V, Supplement to vol. III (Replies made by the Governments to the Schedule of points: 
Replies of Canada and the United States of America). 
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 The methods used by the Preparatory Committee reflected all the main tools that post-
WWII codification works have used: preparation of a report by a rapporteur (Sub-Committee) 
discussing basic principles in the subject-matter,30 the circulation of those principles and 
working papers called “bases of discussion” among states, the request of state commentaries, 
the evaluation of state views and the elaboration of draft articles by a drafting committee, with 
their subsequent submission to states.31 Furthermore, irrespective of the accomplishment of 
each of these stages during the codification process, in the late 1920s the LoN’s initiative 
galvanized states’ comments and private codifications by the very fact of its publicity.32 
 One must recognise that organisational deficiencies and the lack of independent 
expertise hindered a final outcome. After the Preparatory Committee adopted some articles on 
first reading, the Third Committee under the chairmanship of Jules Basdevant “was obliged to 
recognise that the time assigned for its work was not sufficient to allow it to bring a conclusion 
the studies which it had pursued with such assiduity”.33 It could only discuss ten out of thirty-
one bases of discussion submitted to it; many of them interrelated, and finally decided “to 
refrain from any endeavour to embody them in definitive formulae”.34 Despite deficiencies and 
the lack of agreed outcome, the  LoN’s codification process has irreversibly implanted the idea 
of codifying the rules of state responsibility in the mind of international lawyers, together with 
well-established codification methods. 
3 General Principles 
Beyond the codification idea and methodology, the LoN has largely galvanised the 
development of international law in elaborating the basic principles of state responsibility. It 
 
30 LoN, Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law. Annex: Report of the Sub-
Committee (Guerrero Report), C.46.M.23.1926.V, 9 February 1926, pp. 3-16. 
31 Ibid., pp. 17 (Mr Basdevant, Chairman) and 23 (Mr Guerrero, Salvador); on the process: Dhokalia (n 4) 112–
133. 
32 Its impact is manifest in the academic codifications of the same period, e.g. Draft convention on the 
responsibility of States for injuries caused in their territory to the person or property of aliens, prepared by the 
German International Law Association, 1930, in: First report on State responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, 
Special Rapporteur, vol. II YbILC, (1969) (First report of Ago), pp. 149-151, Annex VIII (1930 draft of the 
German International Law Association);  Draft prepared by the Harvard Law School in 1929, in: vol. II YbILC, 
(1956) pp. 229-230 (Draft prepared by the Harvard Law School) and its commentary, “‘Responsibility of States 
for Damage Done in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners’ (1929) 23 Special Number 
Supplement to the American Journal of International Law 133, 140. 
33 Annex V: Draft report drawn up by the rapporteur, M. De Visscher (Belgium) at the Request of the Chairman, 




has contributed to the definition of the constitutive elements of state responsibility (section 3.1) 
and to the elimination of domestic law in the determination of state responsibility (section 3.2). 
3.1.  Definition of State Responsibility 
Due to the conference’s limitation to state responsibility for damage caused to the person or 
property of foreigners, there was no accepted definition of state responsibility at the beginning 
of the conference. The Preparatory Committee expressly inquired among states “what elements 
of wrongfulness must attach to the acts” attributable to the state “in order to render the State 
responsible”.35 The bases of discussion answered this question generally: they provided that 
the state is responsible for the damage suffered by a foreigner when the state’s conduct is 
contrary to the obligations imposed on that state by international law.36 
 State representatives in The Hague however did not start the discussions in a tabula 
rasa, but based on an old acceptance of state responsibility for the breach of international 
obligations through action or omission going back to Grotius.37 Moreover, despite the 
conference’s focus on the protection of foreigners, the LoN’s experts foresaw the codification 
of sufficiently general rules beyond this domain.38 Various delegates also expressed their 
readiness to codify the general rules of state responsibility.39 
 Some delegations suggested a broad definition foreseeing state responsibility to any 
failure to comply with international obligations, without requiring damage.40 Especially the 
French formula received much appreciation from the delegates, providing that “any failure on 
the part of the organs (legislative, executive or judicial) of a State to carry out the international 
 
35 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 27, pp. 25.  
36 Bases Nos. 2. 5(2), 7, 12, 13 and 16. 
37 Hugo Grotius and AC Campbell, The Rights of War and Peace: Including the Law of Nature and of Nations 
(Autograph éd de luxe, MW Dunne 1901) 256 (Book I/Chapter XXI)., also cited at the conference: 
C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.V, supra note 22, pp. 33 (Mr d’Avila Lima, Portugal). 
38 See the level of abstraction in the Guerrero report, supra note 28, pp. 4-5, 7; Progressive codification of 
international law. Report of the Committee of Three Jurists appointed by the Council on December 14th, 1928, 
C.171.(I).1929.V, 25 June 1929, p. 3 (distinguishing between the subject ‘international responsibility of States’ 
and the ‘question of damage caused in their territory to the person or property of foreigners [...] to be dealt with 
at The Hague Conference for the Progressive Codification of International Law’). 
39 Eg C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.V, supra note 22, pp. 89 (Mr Richter, Germany), 91 (Mr Matter, France), 93 (Mr 
d’Avila Lima, Portugal). 
40 Ibid., pp. 24 (Mr Matter, France), 25 (Mr Richter, Germany), 27 (Romania; Mr Guerrero, Salvador). 
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obligations of that State involves its responsibility”.4142 France considered this principle as 
reflecting the existing law43 and the delegates adopted it unanimously.44  
 This draft Article 1 adopted in first reading at the French proposal was specified to the 
context of the protection of foreigners and required damage: 
International responsibility is incurred by a State if there is any failure on the part of its 
organs to carry out the international obligations of the State which causes damage to 
the person or property of a foreigner on the territory of the State.45 
Other delegations proposed a provision on the reparation that the responsible state shall make 
for the damage suffered by a foreigner.46 The principle that any internationally wrongful act 
entails a legal obligation of reparation had been soundly established in international case law 
at the time and The Hague codification conference also confirmed it in its draft Article 3 
adopted on first reading.47 
 Before The Hague Conference, scholarship was however divided between the 
subjectivist theory of fault48 and the objectivist theory requiring the mere wrongfulness for 
responsibility.49 The former, requiring intentional (dolus) or negligent (culpa) conduct on the 
part of the state agent while committing the wrongful act, dominated international law theory 
on state responsibility from the 17th until the early 20th century.50 There were even few 
precedents in the early 20th century following the fault theory.51 However, theorists like Triepel 
and Anzilotti persuasively purified the law of State responsibility from considerations of 
culpability,52 and the dominant case law supported their views, reducing responsibility to the 
 
41 Case concerning the Factory at Chorzów, PCIJ Ser. A, no. 17. 
42 Ibid., p. 24. 
43 Ibid., p. 30 (Mr Matter, France). 
44 Ibid., p. 31. 
45 C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.V, supra note 22, Annex IV: Text adopted by the Committee in first reading as 
revised by the Drafting Committee, pp. 236-237 (Text adopted in first reading), Article 1. 
46 C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.V, supra note 22,  
pp. 27 (South Africa), 28 (Mr Hackworth, USA). 
47 Text adopted in first reading, supra note 45, pp. 236, Article 3. 
48E.g. Jacques Dumas, ‘La Responsabilité Des Etats à Raison Des Crimes et Délits Commis Sur Leur Territoire 
Au Préjudice d’étrangers’ 36 Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye 187, 211–213. 
49 See a summary of the different authors in: Clyde Eagleton, The Responsibility of States in International Law 
(New York University Press 1928) 208–213. 
50 Andrea Gattini, Zufall Und Force Majeure Im System Der Staatenverantwortlichkeit Anhand Der ILC-
Kodifikationsarbeit (Duncker & Humblot 1991) 18–20. 
51 See at the end of 19th century state practice in Chile, Venezuela and Brazil, in: Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “Le fait 
generateur de la responsabilite’ intemationale des. Etats”, RdC (1984-V) pp. 61 ff.; a later case arguably relying 
on culpa is the case of Home Missionary Society, UNRIAA, 1920, vol. 6, p. 42 (no government is responsible for 
the acts of rebels where it itself was guilty of no breach of good faith or negligence in suppressing the revolt). 
52 Triepel (n 22) 334; Anzilotti (n 22) 136. 
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mere wrongful act of the state.53 The debate persisted in the interwar period and even three 
years before The Hague, the Institute of International Law’s discussions showed the division 
of the scholarship on the issue,54 and led to a resolution requiring fault in the definition of state 
responsibility for damage caused to foreigners, depending on the given primary law 
obligation.55 The scholarly debate was mentioned in The Hague too,56 but as the Rapporteur, 
Charles De Visscher, opposed the psychological or moral understanding of fault and accepted 
the notion simply as the violation of an international obligation,57 his pragmatism influenced 
the working definition accepted. The pragmatic decision in The Hague to eliminate the culpa-
debate also anticipated the ILC’s nuanced view on the issue: under Articles 2 and 12 ARSIWA, 
state responsibility does not require fault before the characterization of the conduct as 
internationally wrongful, but in the given case the concerned primary norm obligation might 
foresee fault for its violation.58 This is the case especially with state responsibility for omissions 
where considerations of intention and knowledge matter.59 
 Another dividing line was the inclusion of damage in the content of state responsibility: 
whereas certain commentators required damage for state responsibility,60 others did not 
consider it as a defining element. As most codifications similar to that of The Hague focused 
on state responsibility related to damage caused to foreigners, damage was considered part of 
the primary law violation. The report of the Sub-Committee charged with the preparation of 
the LoN’s codification also held that damage only arises in “certain circumstances” because 
“damage does not per se imply international responsibility. For international responsibility to 
exist, the damage must be the result of a violation, by the State itself, of some international 
rule”.61 The fact that the discussions did not specifically conceptualise damage as an element 
 
53 See various decisions cited in: Eagleton (n 50).; Draft prepared by the Harvard Law School, supra note 30. 
54 Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international, (1927) pp. 103-107, 
55 Institute of International Law, Resolution of 1927 at the session of Lausanne, Draft on “international 
responsibility of States for injuries on their territory to the person or property of foreigners”, reported in: vol. II 
YbILC (1956) pp. 227-229, Article I(4) (“This responsibility of the State does not exist if the lack of observance 
of the obligation is not a consequence of a fault of its organs, unless in the particular case a conventional or 
customary rule, special to the matter, admits of responsibility without fault.”). 
56 E.g. against the subjective culpa: C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.V, supra note 22, pp. 86 (Mr Lansdown, South 
Africa), 98 (Mr Limburg, Netherlands). 
57 Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international, supra note 52, pp. 106; Charles De Visscher, ‘Notes Sur La 
Responsabilité Des États et La Protection Diplomatique d’après Quelques Documents Récents’ (1927) 8 Revue 
de droit international et de législation comparée 245, 252. 
58 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, vol. II(2) 
YbILC, (2001) [ARSIWA Commentary], pp. 34-35, para. 3; pp. 36, para. 10 and pp. 54-55, para. 2; James 
Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (Cambridge University Press 2013) 93, 113–114, 217–220. 
59 E.g. in this sense: Corfu Channel case, Judgment of April 9th, 1949, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 18. 
60 Paul Fauchille, Traité de Droit International Public, vol 1: Paix (A Rousseau & Cie 1922) 515; AG Heffter, 
Le Droit International Public de l’Europe (Jules Bergson tr, 3rd edn, Cotillon et fils 1873) 200. 
61 Guerrero report, supra note 28, pp. 6. 
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of state responsibility implied the present dominant view under which damage is a consequence 
of the content of the primary obligation rather than constitutive element of state 
responsibility.62 
 After the LoN’s codification process, most commentators defined state responsibility 
as the consequence of a violation of international law obligations,63 without considering 
subjective fault or damage as definitional elements of secondary norms. 
3.2.  Irrelevance of Domestic Law in Determining State Responsibility 
It was not an accident that the very first point of discussion that the Preparatory Committee of 
the Conference for the Codification of International Law drew up in 1929 was the irrelevance 
of domestic law in the determination of state responsibility for the damage caused to foreigners. 
Under the text of the first point of discussion, “a State cannot escape its responsibility under 
international law by invoking the provisions of its municipal law.”64 Quite ambiguously, the 
Preparatory Committee inserted the provision at the beginning of the chapter title 
“[c]ircumstances under which States can decline their responsibility”,65 while it was clear for 
states that the provision excluded the invocation of domestic law as falling under this category 
of cases.  
 The rule’s pedigree goes back to the Alabama Claims Arbitration award,66 confirmed 
by other arbitral decisions in the interwar period.67 By 1930, the PCIJ had also firmly 
established the rule according to which conformity with the provisions of internal law in no 
way precludes conduct being characterized as internationally wrongful.68 In its resolution on 
 
62 ARSIWA Commentary, supra note 56, pp. 36, para 9. 
63E.g. Maurice Bourquin, ‘Règles Générales Du Droit de La Paix’ (1931) 35 Recueil des cours de l’Académie 
de droit international de La Haye 5, 212; Karl Strupp, ‘Les Règles Générales Du Droit de La Paix’ (1934) 47 
Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye 263, 557–558; Jules Basdevant, ‘Règles 
Générales Du Droit de La Paix’ (1936) 58 Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye 
475, 668. 
64 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 27, pp. 16. 
65 C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.V, supra note 22, pp. 201. 
66 Alabama claims of the United States of America against Great Britain, 14 September 1872, UNRIAA, vol. 
XXIX, p. 131 (‘And whereas the judicial acquittal of the Oreto at Nassau cannot relieve Great Britain from the 
responsibility incurred by her under the principles of international law’). 
67 See the examples cited by Ago in: Third report on State responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special 
Rapporteur—The internationally wrongful act of the State, source of international responsibility, vol. II(1) 
YbILC, (1971) pp. 228-229, para. 95. 
68 S.S. ‘Wimbledon’, 1923, PCIJ, Series A, No. 1, pp. 29-30; Greco-Bulgarian ‘Communities’, Advisory 
Opinion, 1930, PCIJ, Series B, No. 17, pp. 32; Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Order of 6 
December 1930, PCIJ, Series A, No. 24, pp. 12; and ibid., Judgment, 1932, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 46, pp. 167; 
Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 1932, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 44, pp. 24. 
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state responsibility adopted in 1927, the Institute of International Law found it necessary to 
expressly provide on the irrelevance of domestic law in the determination of international 
responsibility.69 As private codifications also adopted provisions in a similar sense,70 The 
Hague codification conference had good reasons not to overlook the increased international 
consensus about the rule. 
 Most states were in favour of this principle,71 while few expressed specific reservations. 
France stressed that the decisions of the French courts concerning the responsibility of the state 
for damage caused to foreigners are based on municipal and not international law.72 Romania 
could not accept a supposed “existence of an international law on a higher plane than the 
constitution and internal laws of the various States”.73 Beyond those views, the Third 
Commission concluded that the government replies showed “unanimous acceptance of the idea 
that the responsibility of a State under international law for damage caused on its territory to 
the person or the property of foreigners is distinct from its responsibility under its own laws”.74 
It concluded that there was no need to express this idea in the proposed Convention, and 
adopted the text as follows: “A State cannot escape its responsibility under international law 
by invoking the provisions of its municipal law”.75 
 As the responsibility of the state for unlawful conduct towards its own citizens was at 
the time not yet regulated by international law and was only codified after the Second World 
War, especially in line with international human rights treaties, states distinguished between 
the states municipal responsibility and international responsibility.76 
 Some delegates considered Basis No. 1 “as a statement of principle’ that expresses ‘the 
idea that the laws of a State must conform to the rules of international law”.77 Even though 
 
69 Institute of International Law at Lausanne in 1927, Article I(2), in: vol. II YbILC, (1956) pp. 227-229; See the 
discussions in Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international, supra note 52, pp. 96-98. 
70 E.g. draft code prepared by the Japanese Association of International Law in 1926, Article 5, in: First report 
on State responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, vol. II YbILC, (1969) (First report of Ago), pp. 
141, annex II; Institute of International Law, Resolution of 1927, supra note 55, Article IX(1); Draft prepared by 
the Harvard Law School, supra note 32; 1930 draft of the German International Law Association, supra note 32, 
pp. 150. 
71 E.g. C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 29, pp. 18 (Poland), 19 (Czechoslovakia) (Point 1/Basis of discussion 1); 
ibid., Supplement to vol. III, pp. 4 (U.S.A.). 
72 Ibid., pp. 17. 
73 Ibid., pp. 18. 
74 Ibid., pp. 19. 
75 Ibid. 
76 C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.V, supra note 22, pp. 121, Mr. d'Aliva Lima (Portugal); C.75.M.69.1929.V (n 29), p. 
17 (Hungary). 
77 C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.V, supra note 22, pp. 121, Mr. Novakovitch (Yugoslavia). 
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there was a wide support for the principle, some states insisted to its non-applicability to a 
“domaine réservé”, that is the reserved domain of national sovereignty.78 This reflected the 
contemporary debate about the reach of international law. Commentators accepting the 
existence of a “domaine réservé”, not subject to international norms, relied on Article 15(8) of 
the LoN’s Covenant. Under that provision, “[i]f the dispute between the parties is claimed by 
one of them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is 
solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make 
no recommendation as to its settlement”. Various dispute settlement bodies of the LoN 
interpreted the notion “domaine réservé” (“solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that 
party”) throughout the years: they clarified that it relates to subject matters not regulated by 
international law and thus “depends upon the development of international relations”.79 They 
also pointed out that the decision whether a subject matter falls within the reserved domains 
lies with the Council80 or, without its intervention, international judges.81 The PCIJ held that 
Article 15(8) of the Covenant, which protects the independence of states, is an exception to the 
principles of peaceful settlement of disputes in the LoN under Article 15 “and does not 
therefore lend itself to an extensive interpretation”.82 The LoN’s Committee of Jurists excluded 
from the reach of the reserved domains the transition from a de facto situation to a de jure 
situation in the acquisition of statehood,83 while the Court considered other subject matters 
such as nationality84 or the discretionary submission of disputes to the PCIJ85 as “domaines 
réservés”. 
 The PCIJ, however, made it clear that Article 15(8) does not enable states to exempt 
any subject matter from the reach of international law, but is limited to “certain matters which, 
though they may very closely concern the interests of more than one State, are not, in principle, 
regulated by international law”.86 In The Hague, some delegates like the Greek Politis stressed 
this aspect, noting that the state could by definition incur no responsibility in its conduct within 
 
78 Ibid., pp. 124, Mr. Simpson (Romania). 
79 Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco on Nov. 8th, 1921, Advisory Opinion, 1923, PCIJ, Series B, 
No. 4, pp. 23-24. 
80 LoN, Report of the International Committee of Jurists entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with 
the task of giving an advisory opinion upon the legal aspects of the Aaland Islands question. League of Nations 
Official Journal Special Supplement, October 1920, no. 3 (Aaland Islands Question), p. 4. 
81Ray (n 8) 492. 
82 Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, supra note 79, pp. 25. 
83 Aaland Islands Question, supra note 80, pp. 6. 
84 Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, supra note 79, pp. 24. 
85 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924, PCIJ, Series B, No. 3, pp. 16-17. 
86 Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, supra note 79), pp. 23-24. 
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a reserved domain, where there can be no international obligation.87 This aspect convinced the 
delegations and the proposal on a reference to the reserved domain was omitted.88 
 Another proposed modification aimed to complement municipal law as a prohibited 
ground for escaping state responsibility with another prohibited ground, the lack of 
enforcement machinery to implement the state's international obligations.89 The South African 
delegate had in mind a scenario where domestic law a priori complies with international law, 
but no executive machinery supports its implementation. Therefore, concluded the delegate, 
the state could invoke this enforcement deficiency to escape its international obligations.90 
While the Belgian delegate proposed to address this scenario by the amended reference to “by 
invoking the provisions or deficiencies of its municipal law”,91 the Greek representative 
proposed the wording “by invoking the state of its municipal law” as a compromise solution.92 
The latter amendment was adopted by the delegates.93 In turn, the Drafting Committee 
proposed to suppress the words “the state of” which it put in brackets, and the text adopted by 
the Committee in first reading (Draft Article 5) provided as follows: ”[a] State cannot avoid 
international responsibility by invoking (the state of) its municipal law”.94 
 Other delegations found the provision reasonable, but useless as they considered it 
repeating the basis of Discussion No. 2 on the state’s responsibility for the acts and omissions 
of its legislative power.95 Their proposal to remove the provision was rejected by 19 votes to 
13, which shows nonetheless a strong support for their view. It is not surprising that in the 
1930s, scholars did not contest the rule as applying in all fields of state responsibility.96 The 
long-term impact of the provision discussed and agreed on in The Hague is well-known: 
contemporary and subsequent codifications,97 and the consecutive ILC special rapporteurs on 
state responsibility have adopted the same rule, referring to The Hague codification.98 In 1968, 
 
87 C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.V, supra note 22, pp. 126, Mr. Politis (Greece). 
88 Ibid., pp. 126. 
89 Ibid., pp. 124, Mr. Lansdown (South Africa). 
90 Ibid., pp. 128, Mr. Lansdown (South Africa). 
91 Ibid., pp. 125, Mr.De Visscher (Belgium). 
92 Ibid., pp. 127, Mr. Politis (Greece). 
93 Ibid., pp. 128. 
94 Ibid., pp. 236. 
95 Ibid., pp. 121, Mr. Suarez (Mexico) and p. 125, Mr. Urrutia (Colombia). 
96 Constantin Th Eustathiades, ‘La Responsabilité Internationale de l’État Pour Les Actes Des Organes 
Judiciaires et Le Problème Du Déni de Justice En Droit International’ (Paris 1936) 354. 
97 E.g. 1930 draft of the German International Law Association, supra note 32, Article 7(2)(2)-(3); Draft 
convention on the responsibility of States for international wrongful acts, prepared by Professor Roth in 1932, 
in: ibid., 152, Annex X, Article 4; Draft prepared by the Harvard Law School, supra note 32, Article 2(2). 
98 E.g. Third report on State responsibility, supra note 65, pp. 226-233, paras 86-105 (Draft Article 4). 
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the ILC included the same rule in the draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, the later Article 
27 of the Vienna Convention.99 With slightly different wording, Article 3 ARSIWA codified 
the rule on the characterization of an act of a state as internationally wrongful under 
international law only, irrespective of its lawfulness under domestic law. As a sign of 
continuity, the Commentary of Article 3 ARSIWA cites the provision and the debates of the 
1930 Codification conference.100 
4 Attribution 
Attribution of conduct was very early recognised as part of the law of international 
responsibility,101 but only conceptualised at the end of the 19th century.102 In the LoN’s 
codification process, the preparatory report of the Sub-Committee and state delegates 
recognised attribution as a constitutive element of state responsibility103 and elaborated certain 
attribution norms. Discussions on the conduct of state organs (section 4.1), non-state actors 
(section 4.2) and states subordinated to another state (section 4.3) have long-term influenced 
the development of international law. 
4.1.  State Organs 
Private codifications elaborated before The Hague conference rarely provided on the 
attributability of conduct of state organs104 and very few instruments detailed how far such 
conduct is attributable to the state.105 As the first state-led codification discussing these 
questions, the LoN’s codification process has largely contributed to the legal development. 
 
99 Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Second Session, Summary records 
of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole (United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.70.V.6), 13th meeting, pp. 53-54, paras. 30-40. 
100 ARSIWA Commentary, supra note 58, pp. 37, para. 5; see also Article 32 ARSIWA. 
101 Richard Zouch, Iuris et Iudicii Fecialis, Sive, Iuris Inter Gentes, et Quaestionum de Eodem Explicatio: Qua 
Quae Ad Pacem & Bellum Inter Diversos Principes, Aut Populos Spectant, Ex Praecipuis Historico-Iure-
Peritis, Exhibentur (Carnegie Institution of Washington 1911) 106–107. 
102 Triepel, supra note 52, p. 324-371. 
103 E.g. Guerrero report, supra note 30, pp. 6, 15; C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.V, supra note 22, pp. 87 (Mr 
Guerrero, Salvador). 
104 Institute of International Law, Resolution of , supra note 55, Articles I(2): “This responsibility of the State 
exists even when its organizations act contrary to the law […]”, and II: “‘The State is responsible for the act of 
corporate bodies exercising public functions on its territory.”; Draft prepared by the Harvard Law School, supra 
note 32, Article 7(a): “A state is responsible if an injury to an alien results from the wrongful act or omission of 
one of its higher authorities within the scope of the office or function of such authority [...]”, and (b): “‘wrongful 
act or omission of one of its subordinate officers or employees within the scope of his office or function […]”’. 
105 Ibid., Article I(3) (ultra vires conduct). 
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 In the consultation process, there was a consensus of states that led to basis of 
Discussion No. 12, which provided that: 
 A state is responsible for damage suffered by a foreigner as the result of acts or 
omissions of its officials, acting within the limits of their authority, when such acts or 
omissions contravene the international obligations of the State.106 
States almost unanimously accepted attribution of conducts of the state’s officials to that state 
when acting within the limits of their authority.107 Similarly, all states agreed that “[a]cts or 
omissions of bodies exercising public functions of a legislative or executive character 
(communes, provinces, etc.)”, that is “corporate entities (communes, provinces, etc.) or 
autonomous institutions as exercise public functions of a legislative or administrative 
character” are attributable to the state within which they operate.108 Finding an agreement 
among states about the meaning of state organs was a novelty in international instruments. 
 The common denominator of states’ views became the above-mentioned draft Article 
1 adopted in first reading, stipulating the state’s responsibility for the wrongful acts “of its 
organs”.109 This was the first use of the term “organ” in the history of the codification of state 
responsibility, also adopted by the subsequent ILC rapporteurs.110 As it is well-known, Article 
4 ARSIWA has confirmed draft Article 1 of The Hague codification conference and its 
commentary equally referred to the LoN’s above-mentioned codification drafts.111 
 Beyond the rule on the automatic attributability of state organs’ conducts, The Hague 
codification drafts also included rules on public powers delegated to persons not having the 
quality of state organ. Some states indicated strong support for the attribution to the state of the 
conduct of autonomous bodies exercising public functions of an administrative or legislative 
character.112 Consequently, the Preparatory Committee foresaw the principle under which a 
state is responsible for damage suffered by a foreigner as the result of internationally wrongful 
act of “such […] autonomous institutions as exercise public functions of a legislative or 
administrative character”.113 This constituted the early origin of the later Article 5 ARSIWA, 
 
106 LoN, Conference for the Codification of International Law, Bases of Discussion for the Conference drawn up 
by the Preparatory Committee, vol. 3, Doc. C.75.M.69.1929.V, 3 May 1929, p. 74. 
107 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 106, pp. 70- , the exception being Hungary, p. 72. 
108 Ibid., pp. 90-92 (Basis of Discussion No. 16). 
109 Text adopted in first reading, supra note 45, Article 1. 
110 E.g. ILC, Fourth report on State responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, vol. II YbILC, 
(1972) pp. 72, para. 1. 
111 ARSIWA Commentary, supra note 58, pp. 40, para. 4 and p. 41, para. 8. 
112 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 106, pp. 90 (Germany). 
113 Ibid., pp. 92 (Basis of Discussion No. 16). 
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namely the attribution of the conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental 
authority.114  
 Moreover, the Preparatory Committee addressed the question of ultra vires wrongful 
acts, that is the attributability of conducts exceeding the competence of State organs, providing 
in its basis of Discussion No. 13 that: 
[a] State is responsible for damage suffered by a foreigner as the result of acts of its 
officials, even if they were not authorised to perform them, if the officials purported to 
act within the scope of their authority and their acts contravened the international 
obligations of the State.115 
In The Hague, most states confirmed this rule,116 although certain states questioned whether 
ultra vires conduct would only attenuate or entirely exclude the state's responsibility.117  
 Some of the states, which did not accept this attribution, seemed to merge ultra vires 
conducts, on the one hand, and conducts manifestly unconnected with the official capacity of 
the agent, on the other.118 They did not accept state responsibility for ultra vires conduct, as 
they considered it merely private act.119 Most states however clearly distinguished those two 
cases and held that contrary to ultra vires conducts, attributable to the state, conducts 
manifestly unconnected with the official capacity are not attributable to the state.120 When the 
Preparatory Committee expressly asked the states’ views about conducts of officials 
unconnected with their official duties, most representatives denied that attribution could 
arise.121 
 Due to the frequency of state agents’ unauthorised conducts, the Preparatory Committee 
held that “a rule restricting responsibility to the acts of officials acting within the scope of their 
authority would be inadequate”.122 Likewise, it concluded from the written observations of 
states that an act performed by an official of a state “within the apparent scope” of his or her 
 
114 Article 5 ARSIWA and ARSIWA Commentary, supra note 58, pp. 43, para. 4 citing The Hague conference. 
115 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 106, pp. 78. 
116 Ibid., pp. 74-82; C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.V, supra note 22, pp. 93-94 (Mr Latifi, India), 97 (Mr Limburg, 
Netherlands). 
117 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 106, pp. 73-74 (Switzerland); C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.V, supra note 22, pp. 
87-88 (Mr Guerrero, Salvador, excluding State responsibility for ultra vires conduct). 
118 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 106, pp. 75 (Austria, Bulgaria). 
119 Ibid., pp. 77 (Poland, Czechoslovakia), 81 (Czechoslovakia). 
120 Ibid., pp. 52 (Germany), 71 (Bulgaria), 76 (Finland), 80 (Japan); C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.V, supra note 22, 
pp. 85 (Mr, Lansdown, South Africa), 87 (Mr Nagaoka, Japan), 94-95 (Mr Dinichert, Switzerland), 96 (Mr 
Matter, France). 
121 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 106, pp. 82-85. 
122 Ibid., pp. 78. 
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authority in a foreign country (a diplomatic agent, a consul) must be considered act of the 
state.123 
 The text adopted by the Committee in first reading reflected the majority view on the 
attributability of ultra vires conduct, and the non-attribution of apparent ultra vires conduct. 
The adopted draft Article 8 provided: 
International responsibility is incurred by a State if damage is sustained by a foreigner 
as a result of acts or omissions of its officials, acting within the limits of their authority, 
when such acts or omissions contravene the international obligations of the State. 
International responsibility is likewise incurred by a State if damage is sustained by a 
foreigner as a result of unauthorized acts of its officials performed under cover of their 
official character, if the acts contravene the international obligations of the State. 
International responsibility is, however, not incurred by a State if the official’s lack of 
authority was so apparent that the foreigner should have been aware of it and could, 
inconsequence, have avoided the damage124. 
As a sign of its long-term effect, the commentary of Article 7 ARSIWA expressly cites Draft 
Article 8(2)125 and recognises the difficulty to draw the line between unauthorised but still 
“official” conduct, on the one hand, and conduct removed from official functions, on the 
other.126 
4.2.  Non-state Actors 
Codifications and case law before 1930 recognised that the state is not responsible for wrongs 
caused by non-state actors, especially individuals or rebels.127 A Special Commission of Jurists 
constituted by the LoN in the Tellini case in 1924 also adopted the principle according to which 
the state bears no responsibility for the wrongful conduct of private persons unless it breached 
its own primary obligations to prevent.128 
 
 
123 Ibid, pp. 82, Basis for Discussion No. 14. 
124 Text adopted in first reading, supra note 45, 236-237, Article 8. 
125 ARSIWA Commentary, supra note 58, pp. 45-46, para. 3. 
126 Ibid., pp. 46, para. 7. 
127 Convention relative to the rights of aliens signed at the second international conference of American States 
(Mexico City, 1902), in: vol. II YbILC (1956) pp. 226, Annex 5, para. 2; Institute of International Law, 
Resolution of 1927, supra note 55, Articles III and VII; Draft prepared by the Harvard Law School, supra note 
32, Article 11. 
128 League of Nations Official Journal (1924), no. 4, p. 524. 
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 In the LoN’s codification process, states agreed that the conduct of private individuals 
is not attributable to the state,129 while certain states put the emphasis on the state's 
responsibility for its own omission. According to the latter focus, the state incurs responsibility 
for the violation of its own due diligence obligation to take reasonable measures within the 
limits of its power to prevent and repress wrongful conducts.130 The Preparatory Committee 
adopted this majority view as one of the articles: 
As regards damage caused to foreigners or their property by private persons, the State 
is only responsible where the damage sustained by the foreigners results from the fact 
that the State has failed to take such measures as in the circumstances should normally 
have been taken to prevent, redress, or inflict punishment for the acts causing the 
damage.131 
A special case of the state’s non-responsibility for the conduct of individuals is the wrongful 
acts of insurgents, confirmed by the basis of Discussion No. 22 drafted by the Preparatory 
Committee. For the damage caused by unsuccessful insurrectional movements, most states 
agreed that the state does not incur responsibility through attribution.132 Most states also 
reiterated that the state is responsible for the omission to comply with its own due diligence 
obligation to take all reasonable measures within its power. Various states added that 
responsibility arises however if the state pays compensation only to its own nationals but not 
to foreigners, based on a norm on the equal treatment of foreigners and nationals,133 considered 
by certain former codifications as a rule of state responsibility.134 The agreement of the states 
on the non-responsibility for the damage caused by insurgents as a main rule led the Preparatory 
Committee to conclude that “[i]n principle, the replies do not admit that a State is responsible 
for damage caused to foreigners by insurgents, rioters or mob violence”.135 
 However, where the insurrectional movement is successful and installed in power, state 
comments held that the state shall be responsible for the wrongful acts of the insurrectional 
movement.136 Few states were of the contrary view: for instance, the Netherlands doubted 
“whether the insurgent party can be held responsible for acts committed previous to its 
 
129 Eg C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 106, pp. 21 (Bulgaria), 93 (South Africa, Germany), 95 (Japan, Norway). 
130 Ibid., Basis of Discussion No. 17, pp. 93-96. 
131 Text adopted in first reading, supra note 45 pp. 236-237, Article 10. 
132 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 106, Basis of Discussion No. 22, pp. 108-120. 
133 Ibid., e.g. pp. 108 (South Africa, Australia), 109 (Belgium, Finland, Great Britain), 110 (Hungary) and 114-
116 (Basis of Discussion No. 22(b)). 
134 E.g. Institute of International Law, Resolution of 1927, supra note 55, Article 4. 
135 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 106, pp. 111. 
136 Ibid., pp. 116-118 (Point IX(c)/Basis of discussion 22(c)) and 109 (Great Britain). 
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assumption of power”.137 Contrary to this minority view, other states such as Switzerland 
expressly recognised the principle of continuity under which “every Government must be 
responsible for the acts of its predecessors”.138 Certain states even distinguished between two 
scenarios of successful insurrections: when the movement is incorporated into a new state or 
another state, on the one hand, and when it overthrows government of the state and installs in 
power, on the other.139 The support of most delegations in the LoN for the state’s responsibility 
in case of successful insurrectional movements was at the time not obvious. In 1927, the 
codification of the Institute of International Law on state responsibility reserved the question 
with a huge majority.140 
 The Preparatory Committee concluded that both commenting States and the case law 
recognise that in case of a successful insurrection:  
the State is responsible for the acts of the insurrectionist party to at least the extent to 
which it is responsible for the acts of the legal Government and its agents. The question 
is raised whether one should not go further and consider the State responsible for all the 
acts of the insurgents.141 
Another basis of discussion (No. 22(d)) addressed the similar situation where damage is 
“caused to the person or property of a foreigner by persons taking part in a riot or by mob 
violence if the movement was directed against foreigners as such, or against persons of a 
particular nationality”.142 Most states opined that in this scenario too, the state’s responsibility 
depends on whether it failed to take all necessary measures under the standard of due diligence 
or whether there was negligence on its part.143 
 As it is well known, Article 10 ARSIWA codified the exceptional cases of attribution 
to a State of conduct of an insurrectional or other movement which subsequently becomes the 
new government of the state or succeeds in establishing a new state, with the implied main rule 
on non-attribution of the conduct of unsuccessful insurrectional movements to the state. As 
significant state practice on both non-responsibility for unsuccessful insurrectional movements 
 
137 Ibid., pp. 118 (Netherlands). 
138 Ibid., pp. 118 (Switzerland) ; ibid., Supplement to vol. III, p. 3 (Canada). 
139 Ibid., pp. 117 (Finland). 
140 Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international, supra note 52, pp. 142-143. 
141 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 106, pp. 118. 
142 Ibid., pp. 120. 
143 Ibid., pp. 119-120. 
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and State responsibility for successful insurrectional movements, the ARSIWA commentary 
refers to the preparatory work for the 1930 Hague Conference.144 
4.3.  Subordinated States 
While orally not discussed, the question of state responsibility for the conduct of another state 
was subject to various comments and constitutes a very early state practice for the 
responsibility of a state in connection with the act of another state.  
 A deadlock of the discussion on attribution resulted from the proposed basis of 
discussion on the “responsibility of the State in the case of a subordinate or a protected State, 
a federal State or other unions of States”. The request of commentaries regarding this point 
raised obvious confusion, as the formulation covered two different scenarios: the responsibility 
of a federal state for the conduct of its component, autonomous or federative units, on the one 
hand, and the responsibility of a state in connection with the act of another sovereign state, on 
the other. While the first scenario was not contested by states and experts of the LoN,145 the 
second led to controversies. Responsibility for the act of another state or also “indirect 
responsibility” in the reports of Roberto Ago,146 was a crucial question in both the interwar and 
the de-colonisation period, as dependent territories such as occupied states, mandated or trust 
territories constituted a high variety of subordinate interstate relationships.147 The 
responsibility of the protecting state for the wrongful conduct of the dependent entity was all 
the more complicated that some of the dependent territories in their pre-independence phase, 
before becoming states as a matter of international law, participated in international relations. 
For instance, some of those dependent entities were original members of the LoN (Australia, 
Canada, India, New Zealand, South Africa) and later the UN (India, Philippines, Lebanon and 
Syria). 
 Contemporary scholarship elaborated two rival views about the responsibility for the 
wrongs committed by dependent entities. According to the early dominant view, a state should 
be held responsible for the internationally wrongful act of another state if the latter, having 
accepted the domination of the former, conferred on it the right to represent it vis-a-vis third 
 
144 ARSIWA Commentary, supra note 58, pp. 50, para. 3 and 52, para. 13. 
145 E.g. Guerrero report, supra note 30, pp. 6, 16; C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 106, pp. 122 (Great Britain, 
Hungary), 123 (Italy, Norway), 123-124 (Switzerland). 
146 Eighth report on State responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur. The internationally wrongful 
act of the State, source of international responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/318 and Add.l to 4, in: vol. II(1) YbILC 
(1979) pp. 4-5. 
147 Ibid., pp. 5-6, para. 5. 
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states in international relations.148 Some arbitrators149 and private codifications preceding The 
Hague conference150 also adopted this representation theory. The second, increasingly 
dominant view held the dominant state responsible not on account of representing the 
dependent entity in international relations, but on account of its effective power over the 
subordinated entity, “whether this involves a de jure relationship or even, in some opinions, a 
purely de facto one”.151  
 States in The Hague were divided along and even beyond those existing schools, the 
representation theory and that of effective control. On the one hand, most states held that the 
state representing the wrongdoer state in its international relations should incur 
responsibility,152 while few states considered the wrongdoer State which performed the actual 
wrongful act as responsible.153 On the other hand, Denmark defended the theory of 
effectiveness and put the emphasis on the degree of control exercised by the dominant state 
over the subordinate state.154 This view became dominant among scholars including the later 
ILC rapporteur Ago from the 1930s,155 recognising that the mere existence of the international 
representation relationship between two states had no consequences for third states, nor did it 
influence the subordinated state’s capacity to provide reparation. Furthermore, state practice 
confirmed the theory of effectiveness.156 There has been no state practice however to confirm 
the assertion that a state, having undertaken the general and obligatory representation of 
another state, is for that reason alone indirectly responsible for internationally wrongful acts 
committed by the represented state.157 
 
148 Anzilotti (n 22) 146–147; Dionisio Anzilotti, ‘La Responsabilité Internationale Des États à Raison Des 
Dommages Soufferts Par Des Étrangers’ (1906) 13 Revue générale de droit international public 5, 300–301. and 
other authors cited in Eighth report of Ago, supra note 146, pp. 6 and footnote  11. 
149 Affaire des biens britanniques au Maroc espagnol (Espagne contre Royaume-Uni), UNRIAA, 1st May 1925, 
vol. II, p. 648; PCIJ, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Series A – No. 2, Judgment of 30 August 1924 
(Objection to the Jurisdiction of the Court), p. 23. 
150 Institute of International Law, Resolution of 1927, supra note 55, Article IX(2); Draft prepared by the 
Harvard Law School, supra note 32, Article 3. 
151 Eighth report of Ago, supra note 144, pp. 5-6, para. 4. 
152 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 106, pp. 121 (South Africa, Germany, Australia, Austria), 122 (Great Britain), 
123 (Japan, Poland), 124 (Czechoslovakia); C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.V, supra note 22, pp. 212 (Finland), 221 
(India), 231 (USA). 
153 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 106, pp. 122 (Bulgaria). 
154 Ibid., pp. 122 (Denmark). 
155 Eighth report of Ago, supra note 144, pp. 7, para. 7; Clyde Eagleton, The Responsibility of States  States in 
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Heinrich Finck c. Gouvernement Egyptien, Cour d’appel mixte d’Alexandrie, 1st March 1927, in: 55 Journal du 
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note 144, pp. 21-24, paras 34-41. 
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 The logic scrutinizing the effective exercise of power or control was the test that the 
ILC finally adopted seven decades later while preparing Article 17 ARSIWA.158 While 
categories of dependencies between sovereign States have disappeared from State practice, the 
scenario resembles to the interstate relationship based on control that the ILC later called 
“direction and control exercised over the commission of an internationally wrongful act”.159 
Therefore, The Hague codification is important as it marked an early turn from the 
representation theory towards effectiveness as the decisive test for the responsibility of a state 
in connection with the act of another state.  
5 Circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
Early scholarship of international law remarked the importance of certain circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness that would otherwise not be in conformity with the international 
obligations of the concerned State. International law scholars of the 17th-18th centuries managed 
to identify necessity,160 force majeure,161 the state’s inability to perform its obligation162 or 
self-defence163 as circumstances precluding the state’s responsibility or wrongfulness. The 
early 20th century positivist pioneers of the law of state responsibility equally took into account 
certain causes precluding wrongfulness such as necessity,164 without generalising the topic and 
systemising those circumstances. There was no clarity as to the question whether those 
scenarios precluded international responsibility165 or even the wrongfulness of the conduct, that 
is the breach of an international obligation.166 International law codifications before 1930 also 
failed to recognise the broader category, except for providing on the non-responsibility for 
wrongful acts of unsuccessful insurrections.167 
 
158 ARSIWA Commentary, supra note  58, pp. 69, para. 7. 
159 Article 17 ARSIWA. 
160 Zouch (n 102) 111. 
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162 Cornelis van Bynkershoek, Quaestionum juris publici libri duo (Tenney Frank tr, Clarendon Press 1930) 
193. 
163 Emer de Vattel, Le droit des gens; ou Principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des 
nations et des souverains, (Charles G Fenwick and Albert Geouffre de Lapradelle trs, Carnegie institution of 
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 The major achievement in the LoN’s codification process was the recognition of the 
broader category: the Preparatory Committee inserted various points of discussion under the 
title “circumstances under which States can decline their responsibility”, constituting the very 
first attempt to codify circumstances precluding wrongfulness. Only two states objected to this 
subject matter, claiming that it would be difficult to determine and regulate the cases in which 
a State might be exempted from responsibility.168 All other commenting states consented to the 
theme and accepted some circumstances that would exclude responsibility. 
 Among the specific circumstances, the Preparatory Committee addressed to states 
questions regarding self-defence,169 reprisals,170 unilateral abrogation of treaties between 
states,171 contractual undertaking by a private person not to have recourse to the diplomatic 
remedy,172 and exhaustion of domestic remedies.173 The latter three topics did not become part 
of the contemporary canon of circumstances precluding wrongfulness, but two of them found 
some echo in later codifications. First, states in the LoN’s codification process were divided as 
to unilateral abrogation of treaties between states as a circumstance excluding responsibility 
and the Preparatory Committee considered it as a question of investment treaties (a concession 
granted by the state or a contract concluded between the state and the foreigner), without the 
need to codify a special rule of state responsibility.174 In line with this logic and despite the 
inherent link of the rebus sic stantibus rule with state responsibility,175 the ILC has considered 
it as a question of the law of treaties rather than that of state responsibility and inserted it in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.176 Second, a contractual undertaking by a private 
person not to have recourse to the diplomatic remedy led to the recognition of a negative rule, 
excluding that such an undertaking could bind the state of nationality and influence the 
responsibility of the wrongdoer state.177 As the discussion focused on the permissibility and 
effect of the so-called Calvo clause, often interpreted as a waiver of the right of the state of 
nationality to provide diplomatic protection in respect of a wrongful act of the host state, the 
 
168 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 29, pp. 125 (Egypt), 127, 130, and 132 (Poland). 
169 Ibid., pp. 128 (Point XI(a)/Basis of Discussion No. 24). 
170 Ibid., pp. 130 (Point XI(b)/Basis of Discussion No. 25). 
171 Ibid., pp. 131 (Point XI(c)/no specific basis of discussion prepared). 
172 Ibid., pp. 134 (Point XI(d)/Basis of Discussion No. 26). 
173 Ibid., pp. 136 (Point XI(d)/Basis of Discussion No. 27). 
174 Ibid., pp. 133. 
175 E.g. ILC, 694th Meeting, 6 June 1963, vol. I YbILC, (1963) pp. 142, para. 70 (Mr. Pessou); ARSIWA 
Commentary, supra note 58, pp. 83, para. 14 (the stringency and the negative wording of both Article 25 
ARSIWA and Article 62 VCLT). 
176 Article 62 (Fundamental change of circumstances), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
177 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 29, pp. 135 (Basis of Discussion No. 26). 
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negative opinion of most States in The Hague helped the ILC to leave it aside from the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies rule in the law of diplomatic protection.178 Third, the 
exhaustion of local remedies rule, unanimously supported by states in The Hague,179 has 
become part of the ARSIWA under the chapter “invocation of the responsibility of a State”.180 
Two other scenarios, self-defence (5.1) and reprisals (5.2), merit further attention as they have 
become part of the ARSIWA chapter on circumstances precluding wrongfulness. 
5.1.  Self-defence 
While most states in le LoN’s codification process accepted self-defence as a circumstance 
excluding unlawfulness, some also required liability for the lawfully caused damage.181 States 
defined situations of self-defence in different ways, some applying it to insurrections within 
the state,182 others to unlawful attack by states,183 or exceptionally by private persons,184 and 
even to acts occurring outside the national territory but capable of compromising the state’s 
security (such as the Caroline case in 1837).185 This divergence is explained by the fact that 
the question was whether self-defence could be regarded as a circumstance precluding the 
wrongfulness of state conduct in the area of responsibility for the failure to protect foreign 
nationals rather than for acts committed directly against a foreign state.186 Moreover, certain 
states unsurprisingly expressed doubts about the feasibility to agree on an international 
definition of aggression.187  
 Based on the states’ comments, the Preparatory Committee limited its discussion to 
self-defence within the state’s own territory and avoided the state’s responsibility for damage 
caused to foreigners in the exercise of self-defence outside its territory that it considered falling 
within the laws of war.188 Its basis of discussion on self-defence provided as follows: 
 
178 ILC, Third report on diplomatic protection, by Mr. John Dugard, Special Rapporteur, vol. II(1) YbILC, 
(2002) pp. 78, para. 136 (taking into account State comments of The Hague); Diplomatic protection: Draft 
articles with commentaries, vol. II(2) YbILC, (2006) pp. 45, para. 8. 
179 Ibid., pp. 136-139. 
180 Article 44(b) ARSIWA. 
181 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 29, pp. 125 (South Africa), 126 (Great Britain, India), 127 (New Zealand). 
182 Ibid., pp. 125 (South Africa). 
183 Ibid., pp. 125 (Belgium). 
184 Ibid., pp. 126 (Denmark). 
185 Ibid., (Denmark). 
186 ILC, Draft articles on State responsibility, vol. II(2) YbILC, (1980) pp. 57, para. 14, and footnote 202. 
187 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note 29, pp. 127 (Switzerland). 
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A State is not responsible for damage caused to a foreigner if it proves that its act was 
occasioned by the immediate necessity of self-defence against a danger with which the 
foreigner threatened the State or other persons.  
Should the circumstances not fully justify the acts which caused the damage, the State 
may be responsible to an extent to be determined.189 
While the conference did not have time to discuss the proposed topic, some aspects of the basis 
of discussion have had long-term impact on developments of international law. South Africa 
proposed to limit the non-responsibility for the damage caused in the exercise of “the 
preservation of the public peace and security” to conduct not exceeding “the reasonable 
requirements of the situation”,190 thereby foreseeing the proportionality requirement of self-
defence, crystallized after WWII.191 The second paragraph of the basis of discussion inspired 
the first ILC rapporteur on state responsibility, Gracía-Amador, who considered that “[o]wing 
to their analogy with the case of self-defence, it may be considered that the extent of 
responsibility may also vary in cases of force majeure and necessity”.192 Based on this analogy, 
his draft provided that force majeure and state of necessity, “if not admissible as grounds for 
exoneration from responsibility, shall operate as extenuating circumstances”.193 Whereas his 
draft article on force majeure and state of necessity absorbed self-defence, his successors 
maintained a separate article for self-defence, citing both the states’ comments and basis of 
discussion prepared in the LoN’s codification process.194  
 The point to emphasize here is not the lasting impact of the primary norm content of 
self-defence as understood in the interwar period,195 but the idea that the use of force in self-
defence precludes the wrongfulness of the acts in which force is so used. As the first ILC special 
rapporteur on state responsibility noted, after the adoption of the UN Charter, “the right of self-
defence, at all times recognized as one of those exercisable by the State for its own preservation, 
 
189 C.75.M.69.1929.V, supra note  29, pp. 128 (Basis of Discussion No. 24). 
190 C.351(c)M.145(c).1930.V, supra note 22, pp. 229. 
191 Military and Paramilitary Activities in und against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). 
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Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 245, para. 41. 
192 International responsibility: report by F. V. Garcia Amador, Special Rapporteur, vol. II YbILC, (1956) pp. 
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193 International responsibility: Sixth report by F. V. Garcia Amador, Special Rapporteur, vol. II YbILC, (1961) 
pp. 48, Draft Article 17(4). 
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has become subject to the conditions laid down in Article 51 of the Charter”.196 The substantive 
law understanding of self-defence before 1945 certainly differed from that under the UN 
Charter, and this was reflected in the above-mentioned diverging state comments on the nature 
of self-defence. However, the latter has evolved with the gradual affirmation of the principle 
of the prohibition of recourse to war and as a necessary exception to that principle, enshrined 
in interwar instruments such as the Covenant of the LoN or the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Until the 
final outcome of the ILC works on State responsibility, the Commission and the special 
rapporteurs on state responsibility took into account the state comments expressed in the LoN’s 
codification process and integrated the idea of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in 
Article 21 ARSIWA. 
5.2.  Reprisals 
On the other proposed circumstance, reprisals, states had even more diverse views. Generally 
speaking, reprisals are understood as a ‘course of conduct which is not in conformity with the 
terms of an international obligation and has been adopted in certain circumstances by a State 
towards another State which has previously breached an international obligation towards it”.197 
A Commission of Jurists appointed by the LoN in 1923 following the Italian-Greek Corfu 
incident impliedly accepted non-armed reprisals as lawful measures.198 After that report, LoN 
member states debated only about the lawfulness of armed reprisals short of war.199 
 In the codification process, some states defined situations where reprisals are lawful by 
adding criteria beyond the mere violation of an international obligation by another state. For 
instance, Belgium submitted that a reprisal shall be “proportionate to the gravity of the 
violation, provided that the State cannot obtain satisfaction by pacific means”.200 Denmark held 
that reprisals “can only be lawful when the stipulations of the Covenant have been previously 
fulfilled and the prescribed time limits observed”.201 For the Swiss government, “reprisals 
should only be admitted provided the State resorting thereto possesses no other pacific means 
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of reacting when injured by a violation of the law.”202 The Czechoslovak government, finally, 
proposed that an impartial and independent international tribunal should review “whether the 
conditions necessary for a just defence or for reprisals” were actually present.203 
 The Preparatory Committee declined to reflect on “whether reprisals can today be 
justified, and between what states and in what circumstances they can be justified”, and limited 
its work on a rather general basis of discussion.204 It provided that: 
[a] State is not responsible for damage caused to a foreigner if it proves that it acted in 
circumstances justifying the exercise of reprisals against the State to which the foreigner 
belongs.205 
Both the LoN’s codification experts and the ILC have considered reprisal as a circumstance 
precluding lawfulness, and thus lawful conduct, although the contemporary law of state 
responsibility uses the term “countermeasures”.206 The UN Charter and UN instruments such 
as the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law limited however countermeasures 
to peaceful ones by banning the use of armed reprisals207 - a limitation that Denmark also 
proposed in the LoN’s codification procedure.208 
 To confirm the definition of countermeasures, early ILC drafts209 and the ARSIWA 
Commentary210 also refer to the state comments prepared in the LoN’s codification process. In 
line with the idea to limit reprisals, as expressed by certain delegations in the LoN’s 
codification process, ILC special rapporteurs also required reprisals to be proportionate.211 This 
subsequent practice shows that the LoN’s codification work on self-defence has also 
anticipated later codification developments. 
 The last ILC Special rapporteur of state responsibility, James Crawford recognised the 
state comments and bases of discussion in the LoN’s codification process,212 and referred to 
them in the commentary of the ARSIWA rules on circumstances precluding wrongfulness.213 
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It is true that in The Hague, neither states nor the Preparatory Committee specified whether the 
discussed circumstances excluded state responsibility or even the wrongfulness of the conduct. 
As Ago explained, the distinction was not considered at the time as having any practical 
importance,214 but the above-mentioned comments indicate that some states were ready to 
distinguish between the operation of primary norms, on the one hand, and that of secondary 
norms, on the other.215 As the ILC conceptualised circumstances precluding wrongfulness in a 
relatively mature phase of its work,216 after various changes in classifying those scenarios as 
questions of primary or secondary norms,217 the pioneering drafts and dialogue in the LoN’s 
codification process are remarkable. 
6 Conclusions 
Within the LoN’s codification process, the written and oral dialogue of states and experts on 
state responsibility has established the foundations of a truly universal codification discussion 
that has continued until today. Despite the lack of a single outcome document at the end of The 
Hague conference in 1930 such as a draft treaty or report, the LoN’s codification clarified 
certain general and particular concepts, principles or norms of state responsibility that have 
become part of contemporary international law. 
 First, the working methods and the publicity of the LoN’s codification procedure 
galvanised the interwar debates of international lawyers on the law of state responsibility. 
Moreover, they helped the ILC in adopting similar working methods and referencing the 
discussions as authoritative source of state practice. 
 Second, among general principles, the international wrongfulness of the conduct and 
attribution were confirmed as the constitutive elements of state responsibility, reflecting the 
early 20th century development of state practice. Besides, the LoN’s delegates managed to 
eliminate limitless debates on the requirement of fault or damage as further constitutive 
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30 
 
elements of state responsibility, and thereby anticipated the contemporary dominant opinion 
under which those elements follow from the primary obligations rather than from secondary 
norms. 
 Third, the LoN’s codification clarified some of the secondary norms that are nowadays 
accepted as part of the law of state responsibility. The particular norms mentioned in the areas 
of attribution and circumstances precluding wrongfulness are only examples that have been 
integrated in the contemporary canon of the rules of state responsibility. Several other rules of 
the LoN’s codification process could have been mentioned as they not only anticipated the 
ILC’s ARSIWA, but were referred to by court decisions as such. Examples include the state’s 
responsibility for the wrongful conduct of its domestic tribunals,218 or the requirement of 
exhaustion of domestic remedies.219  
 In conclusion, instead of considering The Hague conference as a failure, it is more just 
to regard the entire LoN’s process as the pioneering start and benchmark of a century-long 
development of the law of state responsibility. The lasting impact of the concepts, principles 
or norms of state responsibility clarified in the LoN’s codification process confirms the 
pioneering work of the LoN. 
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